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In the Suprente Cottrt of the 
State of Utah 
ELIZ1.\. STARTIN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES A. MADSEN, Executor of 
the Estate of James Madsen, Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NO. 7594 
Eliza Startin,· plaintiff in the lower court and respond-
ent here, sued Charles A. Madsen as Executor of the Es-
tate of James Madsen, deceased, for personal services and 
food claimed to have been furnished by her over a period 
of years at the special instance and request of the deceased. 
From a judgment on the verdict of the jury awarding 
plaintiff $4,2.00.00, the defendant executor appeals to this 
Court. To avoid confusion, the executor, Charles A. Mad-
sen, will be referred to as defendant, and Eliza Startin as 
plaintiff, as they were designated before the trial court. 
Since the record most frequently mentions the deceased 
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James Madsen, he will be designated b'y that name or as 
Mr. Madsen, and he and his wife, Priscilla Madsen, will be 
called the Madsens. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to formal allegations and the allegation that 
plaintiff's claim was presented to the executor, which are 
admitted, the complaint states the basis of plaintiff's claim 
as follows: 
"3. That James Madsen, the deceased, was in-
debted to the plaintiff for services rendered over a pe-
riod of six years in the sum of Sixty three hundred 
and NO /100 Dollars ( $6,300.00) , ,consisting of nurs-
ing, washing, cooking, housekeeping, comfort and care, 
together with the furnishing of food and provisions at 
the special instance and request of James Madsen dur-
ing his lifetime at Lakeview, Utah County, Utah." 
(File 3) 
The foregoing allegations were denied by defendant, 
and as an affirmative defense it was alleged that if the de-
ceased was indebted to plaintiff for services rendered, or for 
food and provisions, James Madsen paid plaintiff therefor 
during his lifetime (File 8; 13) . 
James Madsen was a brother of the defendant. The 
two had been partners in operating a fishing camp at Straw-
berry Reservoir over a period of 53 years (Tr. 84-85). Eliza 
Startin, the plaintiff, was their sister. Her home was two 
blocks distant from the Madsens (Tr. 175). James Madsen 
was about 88 years of age at the time of his death (Tr. 6). 
During the last six years of his life he was substantially 
confined to his bed, the lower part of his body being use-
less, incident to a back condition and old age, but he was 
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sound mentally up to the time of his death and the upper 
part of his body was fairly active (Tr. 8; 86-87). His wife, 
Priscilla Madsen, was about 84 years of age (Tr. 7). Dur-
ing the last two or three years prior to James Madsen's 
death, she was suffering from failing memory (Tr. 8; 88). 
Shortly after the time James Madsen's condition became 
such that he could not handle his toilet, pursuant to ar-
rangements of the family, concurred in by the plaintiff, 
the Madsens \Vere removed to the Utah County Infirmary 
for care, where Mrs. James Madsen died in August, 1949, 
about a month later (Tr. 51-52; 101-102; 156-158). It was 
during the period from James Madsen's initial incapacity 
to the time of the removal to the infirmary that plaintiff 
claims that she became entitled to the compensation 
awarded. 
The evidence adduced by plaintiff tended to show that 
she brought meals from her home to the Madsens, and that 
she and her daughters attended to them in the Madsen 
home, and washed and kept house for them over the course 
of these six years (Tr. 3; 84) at the request of James Maa-
sen, who indicated in the beginning at least that he would 
"take care of plaintiff" (Tr. 41-42) or see that she was 
"well paid" (Tr. 58-59; 75-75A). It was also claimed by 
plaintiff's witnesses that the first two and a half years 
plaintiff received from James Madsen $10.00, for "butter 
and eggs and things like that", but that they knew of no 
other payments to her (Tr. 45), or did not know whether 
she was paid (Tr. 21; 75A-76). 
On the other hand, the evidence presented by the de-
fendant tended to show that plaintiff's services were over 
a much briefer period and were more limited in nature than 
claimed by her (Tr. 86; 88; 90; 118; 121; 146; 150; 151; 
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152); that defendant personally, as well as his sons and 
others, provided much of the assistance and companion-
ship for which plaintiff claimed credit (Tr. 89; 99; 135; 138; 
145; 152 and 155); that James Madsen was a man who 
promptly paid his obligations and that he had repeatedly 
made payments to the plaintiff, indicating that they were 
in full to the dates made, some of which were made shortly 
before Mr. Madsen went to the infirmary (Tr. 91; 103; 104; 
140-141); that he felt that the plaintiff was getting more 
from him than she was entitled to (Tr. 96); that when the 
Madsens went to live at the infirmary, Mr. Madsen paid 
the plaintiff $30.00 which she received as the amount ow-
ing to her then, and that she made no other claim until after 
his death, except that she said there was a balance due her 
daughter, Dorothy, a statement for which Dorothy sub-
mitted and which was paid (Tr .. 159-160; 171; defendant's 
exhibits 3, 4 and 5). 
The foregoing summary indicates fairly, we believe, 
the issues raised by the pleadings and the conflicting evi-
dence on which the jury should have been called to act, 
under proper instructions and without irrelevant and incom-
petent testimony to becloud and prejudice the case. If this 
had been so, defendant would have no complaint, notwith-
standing the natural tendency of a jury to be sympathetic 
toward plaintiff. We now refer briefly to the record which 
seems necessary to an understanding of the errors relied 
upon by defendant for a reversal of the judgment. 
Mrs. Mary Hopkins was called by the plaintiff and over 
repeated objections on the part of the defendant, was per-
mitted to testify what she would charge for the nursing of 
one and two patients (Tr. 63-73). It appeared that she was 
a practical nurse of 27 years experience, did not know what 
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others would charge, could not testify what the reasonable 
value of plaintiff's services were, and knew nothing about 
the situation of the Madsens except what she was told in 
inaccurate and misleading hypothetical questions which she 
also ans\vered by stating what she would charge, disclaim-
ing any knowledge as to what the reasonable or usual 
charge would be. Motion to strike her testimony was de-
nied (Tr. 71-72). The court refused defendant's requested 
instruction that the jury should not consider the testimony 
of Mrs. Hbpkins (File 55; defendant's request No. 15). The 
trial court in its ruling on defendant's motion for a new 
trial, conceded its error in failing to instruct the jury to 
disregard Mrs. H]opkins' testimony but held, in effect, that 
since the jury did not return a verdict for the full amount 
prayed for by the plaintiff, it must not have given weight 
to Mrs. Hopkins' testimony that she would have charged a 
total of $15,532.00, applying her rate to the claimed services 
of plaintiff, and that therefore the errors in connection with 
Mrs. Hopkins' testimony were not prejudicial (File 88-89). 
The court refused defendant's requested instruction No. 
19, to the effect that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
recover for services or food or provisions furnished to the 
deceased by persons other than herself, and further refused 
defendant's request No. 20 that plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover for services rendered, or food or provision supplied, 
if any, by plaintiff's daughter, Dorothy Startin (File 60). 
On the contrary, in its instruction No. 16, the court instruc-
ted the jury in effect that if it found an agreement, express 
or implied, between the plaintiff and the deceased, by which 
plaintiff became obligated to pay plaintiff a reasonable com-
pensation, plaintiff may have others assist in the discharge 
of her obligation and recover the reasonable value of such 
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assistance (File 70). The court did not qualify such in-
structions so as to preclude recovery for the value of ser-
vices · rendered by Dorothy Startin, for instance, even 
though she had already been paid for her services; it per-
mitted a recovery for Dorothy Startin's services in full 
and without deduction, notwithstanding that , as the evi-
dence shows beyond question, Dorothy in 1948 received the 
transfer of a lot of land from James Madsen in considera-
tion of what she had done for Mr. Madsen (Tr. 127), and 
notwithstanding that Dorothy, after James Madsen's death, 
submitted bills and was paid for items, including groceries, 
which she claimed she furnished to the Madsens (Tr. 195-
160; defendant's exhibits 3, 4 and 5). The court also as-
sumes ln this instruction that there was evidence from 
which the jury might find that the plaintiff was "obligated" 
by contract to furnish services to James Madsen, whereas 
there is no such contract shown by the evidence. 
In instruction No. 17 the court told the jury that under 
the laws of this state, a husband and wife are jointly and 
severally responsible for payment for necessities furnished 
them, and a person who has furnished such family neces-
sities has the right to recover the full value thereof in an 
action against either one or both spouses (File 70-71). The 
court thus expressly permitted a recovery for services ren-
dered by plaintiff to Priscilla Madsen even though the 
pleading did not show the relationship of husband and wife 
existed between them. The court rejected defendant's re-
quested instructions that plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
for any services rendered to Priscilla Madsen (File 59) .. 
The court would not even permit the defendant on cross 
examination of plaintiff to show that she had presented a 
claim against the estate of Priscilla Madsen for the same 
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services and prov1s1ons, claim for which was being made. 
against the James Madsen estate, and refused to receive 
such claim as it was offered in evidence by defendant (Tr. 
174; 188; defendant's exhibit 2). 
While the court instructed the jury fully as to plain-
tiff's theories, whether as to implied contracts, reasonable 
value, express contracts, presumption of right to reasonable 
compensation, and almost every other conceivable theory 
favorable to plaintiff, it failed to instruct the jury on plain-
tiff's theory that notwithstanding that it might find that 
plaintiff's services were reasonably worth more, or that she 
might otherwise be entitled to more from the standpoint of 
reasonable value, yet if the deceased during his lifetime 
paid money from time to time to Mrs. Startin which was 
received by her as full payment for her services, she would 
not be entitled to recover in this case for such services. 
Defendant's requests numbered 5, 8, 16, 11 and 12 properly 
presented defendant's theory. While the court indicated 
that the first three were given in substance, in "'hole or in 
part, this does not appear to be so; and the two last men-
tioned were refused without qualification. 
The plaintiff appeared in her own behalf, purportedly 
on rebuttal, and over the objection of the defendant that 
she was incompetent under the "Dead Man's Statute," tes-
tified to transactions with the deceased (Tr. 176-177; 177-
178; 179; 182-183; 184; 185; 186-187). 
The court refused defendant's requested instruction 
No.6, cautioning the jury against speculation in the absence 
of evidence that a contract, express or implied, existed; in-
struction No. 10, cautioning against permitting sympathy 
for any party to influence their verdict, and instruction No. 
18, to the effect that the jury should not be concerned with 
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whom the beneficiaries of the estate of James Madsen are, 
of what property the estate consists, or how it was to be; 
divided. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The ·court improperly received the testimony of 
Mrs. Hopkins with respect to the value of services, or what 
she would receive, and in failing to strike out such testi-
mony, and in failing to instruct the jury to disregard it, or 
at least to consider differences between the situation to 
which her testimony related and the services of plaintiff. 
2. The court erred in instructing the jury and in re-
jecting defendant's proffered instructions concerning re-
covery by plaintiff for services and provisions furnished by 
Dorothy Startin and others. 
3. The court erred in instructing the jury that plain-
tiff could recover in this action for services rendered to 
Priscilla Madsen as the wife of James Madsen, and in re-
jecting proof that plaintiff had made an independent claim 
against the estate of Priscilla Madsen, and preventing cross-
examination on the subject. 
4. The court erred in failing and refusing to instruct 
the jury on defendant's theory of the case. 
5. The court erred in receiving testimony of the plain-
tiff as to transactions with the deceased concerning which 
she was incompetent t? testify. 
6. The court erred in refusing to give cautionary in-
structions requested by defendant in view of the nature of 
the ~ase. _ .. 
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1. THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. HOPKINS CON-
CERNING WHAT SHE OR A PRACTICAL NURSE 
"WOULD CHIARGE" FOR HER SERIWCES WAS WITH-
OUT PROPER FOUNDATION, DID NOT IN\"OLVE AN·Y 
CORRECT MEASURE OF VALUE OR DAMAGES AN.D 
WAS MISLEADING A:ND PREJUDICIAD. THE COURT 
THEREFORE ERRJED IN RECEIVING IT OVER DE-
FENDANT'S OBJECTON, IN REFUSING TO STRIKE 
IT OUT AND IN REJECTING REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TIONS CONCERNING IT. 
Mrs. Mary Hopkins, called by the plaintiff, after tes-
. tifying that she thought she would be acquainted with char-
ges made in Provo for practical nursing, but that it had 
been some years since she was in Lakeview, was asked by 
counsel for plaintiff . on direct examination: 
Q. But you know what charges are made by prac-
tical nurses? 
A.. Charges are made-years and years ago they 
were-it wasn't as much as they are now. When I first 
started practical nursing I only received $20 per week; 
but I went from that to $40 per week, and then I prac-
tically quit nursing, but today, if I may--
MR. CHRISTENSON: I wonder if we could have 
an objection, the same objection, if the court please, 
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, if the question 
calls for an answer as to the amount received (Tr. 67). 
THE COURT: I believe the question was, 'Are 
you acquainted with the charges for practical nursing 
in Provo and vicinity'. You can answer that yes or no, 
Mrs. Hopkins, if you are so acquainted, or if you are 
not so acquainted-- -
A. Well, I was acquainted with what they asked 
a few years back but maybe not today. · 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
MR. BACKMAN: Would you be acquainted with 
what a practical nurse would charge six years ago? 
A. Well, that would depend on what she had to 
do. 
* * * * 
MR. BACKMAN: Now, Mrs. Hopkins, in the 
event that you were called into a case where an aged 
person was bedridden and you had to give them a ser-
vice of bathing them and changing their bedding and 
getting their meals and giving them their medicine and 
watching them through the day would you have an 
opinion as to what the charge would be? (Tr. 68). 
A. Yes sir. $7.00 a day. 
Q. $7.00 a day? 
MR. CHRISTENSON: We move to strike out the 
answer if the court please. 
THE COU'RT: It may go out for the purpose of 
the objection and because it is voluntary answer . . . . 
HJer answer is voluntary as to the amount and that 
part of the answer may go out. 
MR. BACKMAN: Just answer yes or no, Mrs. 
Hopkins. Would you know what the charge would be 
in that kind of a case? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Yes? 
A. Well, I cannot--! don't know what the other 
ones would charge. There isn't--I don't think--, 
a standard, or there wasn't. 
MR. BACKMAN: Do you know what a practical 
nurse would charge in that kind of a ·case? 
A. Yes. I don't-·-
MR. CHRISTENSON: Just a minute-
THE COURT: That's answered. 
MR. BACKMAN: Now Mrs. Hopkins, what would a 
practical nurse charge for that kind of a case? 
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MR. CHRISTENSON: Object to it as incompe-
tent, irrelevant and immaterial; no proper foundation 
having been laid, calling for a conclusion (Tr. 69). 
THE COURT: It is overruled. 
MR. BACKMAN: You may answer it . . . . 
A. $7.00 . . . . . and of course your board 
and laundry-room and laundry. 
Q. And that would be the prevailing price six 
years ago? 
A. I couldn't speak, only for myself. 
Q. But that is what you would charge six years 
ago? 
A. Yes, that is what I would charge for one pa-
tient--
Q. Would you know what the charge would be 
in case there were two patients that had to be taken 
care of in the same condition? 
A. I would imagine $50 p~r week. 
Q. Just ans\ver either yes or no. 
A. Yes (Tr. 70). 
Q. Now then, what would be the charge? 
MR. CHRISTENSON: Object to it as incompe-
tent, irrelevant and immaterial; not within the issues 
of the case, calling for a conclusion. We take it that 
the objection may be deemed before the answer if the 
court please. 
THE COURT: Yes, it is overruled. She may an-
swer--
A. I would charge $50, $50 a week for two pa-
tients. 
* * * * 
Q. And you would also be furnished your board 
and room? 
MR. CHRISTENSON: Just a minute. Object to 
that as leading and suggestive. 
THE COURT: It is leading. 
MR. BACKMAN: $50.00 being the care? 
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A. $50 and my board and room, if I took care 
of two patients that had to have nurse's care. 
MR. BACKMAN: That's all. 
MR CHRISTENSON: May our objection be 
deemed ·to have gone before the last question if the 
court please. I hardly had an opportunity . . . . 
THE COURT: It may be. 
MR. CHRISTENSON: We move to strike out the 
testimony of this witness with respect to the charges 
per day or week as she has testified to, as incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial; not within any issue of the 
case; no sufficient foundation having been laid; calling 
for a ·conclusion (Tr. 71) . . . . 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled and the 
motion denied. 
MR. CHRISTE'NSON: May I make a motion, if 
the court please, with specific reference to the last an-
swer as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and on 
the same grounds that I have stated so that the record 
will be clear it goes to both points? 
THE COURT: Yes, and the same ruling (Tr. 72). 
All the questions put to the witness in substance went 
to the points of "what the charge would be" or "what would 
you charge''. The witness indicated repeatedly that she 
could not go beyond saying what she would charge. If ex-
pert testimony were competent at all, it would have tore-
late to what was the reasonable value of services similar 
to those performed by the plaintiff. The only attempt to 
relate any question to the plaintiff's situation was in one 
hypothetical question quoted above in which the question is 
limited by "what the charge would be" . . . . "in the 
event you were called into a case". Among the circumstan-
ces assumed in the question was that she gave them their 
medicine and watched them through the day. There was 
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no evidence in the record that Mrs. Startin ever gave the 
Madsens any medicine or watched them through the day, 
On the contrary, every witness who testified on the subject 
stated that Mrs. Startin called ordinarily either twice or 
three times during the day, principally at meal times. Mrs. 
Hopkins' testimony related to full-time duty by herself as 
an experienced practical nurse. She knew nothing of the 
Madsens' situation and expressly limited her answers to 
what she uwould charge" under the circumstances in her 
own mind, the facts as to the Madsens being unreported and 
unknown to her. Hler testimony that she would charge 
$50 per week, with the court confirming that testimony by 
repeatedly overruling objections thereto and refusing to 
strike out, must have had controlling influence with the 
jury. 
Her testimony that "I would charge $50 per week for 
t\vo patients" must have been the main basis for the jury's 
verdict. It will be noted that most of the testimony of oth-
ers showed that it was less than two years that Mrs. Mad-
sen's condition was at all serious and that Mr. Madsen's 
incapacity was most serious. Two years at $50.00 per week· 
would amount to $5,200. The jury returned a verdict of 
$4,200, and must have proceeded from this basic figure. 
That the admission of such testimony was erroneous 
admits of no question. In the first place, it seems doubtful 
that any "expert" testimony should have been received, in-
asmuch as testimony of witnesses upon matters within the 
scope of the common knowledge and experience of mankind 
must be confined to statements of concrete facts within 
their own observation, knowledge and recollection, as dis-
tinguished from their opinions, inferences, impressions, and 
conclusions drawn from such facts. 20 Am. Jur., Section 
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765, "Evidence", p. 634; second, no proper foundation was 
laid for such testimony in that the witness neither knew of 
her own knowledge the type of services the plaintiff claimed 
to have rendered, nor was she apprised of them; third, the 
single hypothetical question presented to her contained ele-
ments, pointed out above, of which there was absolutely no 
evidence; and, finally, her answers were limited to what 
she "would charge" after a clear indication that she had no 
judgment as to what would be a reasonable, or prevailing, 
or usual, charge and by a clear showing that the situation 
she had in mind, and that of plaintiff, were entirely differ-
ent. The foundation for her testimony, or the substance of 
it, fails to measure up to any of the universally accepted 
tests. 20 Am. Jur., Sec. 787-796, "Evidence", pp. 661-668. 
The court erred in receiving this testimony, and con-
firmed and underscored such error in refusing to strike it 
out upon motion of defendant. Even after the evidence was 
closed the court had an opportunity to avoid or minimize 
the prejudicial consequence of such errors, since the de-
fendant made two requests of the court for instruction to 
the jury on the subject. One was on the theory that the 
evidence of Mrs. Hopkins should be entirely disregarded 
and the other on the theory that it should not be accepted 
as necessarily controlling, but that the jury should con-
sider the difference in the situation of the witness and the 
plaintiff if the jury found such difference to exist. These 
requests follow: 
14. You are instructed that you should not con-
sider the testimony of the witness, Mrs. Hopkins, as 
showing what the reasonable value, if any, of services 
performed by the plaintiff were. 
15. You are instructed that you should not con-
sider that the testimony of the witness Mrs. Hopkins 
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is necessarily applicable to the circumstances of the 
present case, and in connection with such evidence you 
should consider the differences as shown by the evi-
dence between the situation covered by her estimates 
or judgment and the situation of the plaintiff in refer-
ence to James Madsen. 
Certainly, the last request, at the very least, should 
have been given. 
The trial court in its ruling on defendant's motion for 
a new trial conceded that "it was error for the court to have 
permitted Mrs. Hopkins' testimony to remain before the 
jury and to refuse to instruct the jury to disregard it." The 
trial court waived aside these admitted errors by stating 
that the witness "was very difficult of examination and 
very uncertain in her responses. To most of the questions 
submitted, she gave answers which were uncertain, if not 
even evasive." This would seem to be a good reason for 
striking out her evidence, which was admittedly otherwise 
improper. Yet, the court argues that because if the jury 
had fully believed her testimony, they would have returned 
a verdict for $15,532 for the six years, it could not have 
influenced them because they returned a verdict for only 
$4,200. The very reason they may have returned a verdict 
for $4,200 may well have been the testimony of Mrs. Hop-
kins, as they could have found that the services for which 
she was entitled to compensation extended over only two 
years or less, or they may have found that the value of the 
services were more, based upon Mrs. Hopkins' testimony, 
but that the plaintiff had been paid for such services ex-
cept for the $4,200. The probabilities are varied and- defi-
nite as to the influence of this testimony, and the suggestion 
of the trial court that it was not influential seems without 
any substance or justification whatsoever. 
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When substantial error is shown, prejudice will be pre-
sumed. 5 c. J. s., "Appeal and Error," Sec. 1677, P. 816. 
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 
366, 270 Pac. 349, 362, our court pointed out that error 
. must be prejudicial to authorize a reversal, but added: 
"However, where the committed error is of such 
nature or character as calculated to do harm, or on its 
face as having the natural tendency to do so, prejudice 
will be presumed, until by the record it is affirmatively 
shown that the error was not or could not have been of 
harmful effect. Thus, if the appellant shows commit-
ted error of such nature or character, he, in the first 
instance, has made a prima facie showing of prejudice.· 
The burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is 
then cast on the respondent to show by the record that 
the committed error was not, or could not have been 
of harmful effect. State v. Cluff, 48 Utah 102, 158 
Pac. 701; Jackson Stone, et al v. Feather River & Gib-
sonville Water Co., 14 Cal. 19; Thelin v. Stewart, 100 
Cal. 372, 34 Pac. 861; 2 Hayne, New Trial and Appeal 
(2d Ed) pp. 1608-1614. 
See also Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 73 
Utah 486, 275 Pac. 582; also Fromme v. Lang & Co., 181 
Pac. 120, and Hill v. Bank of San Pedro, 10'( P2d 399. 
Error and prejudice go hand in hand, until the latter 
which is the creature of presumption, is met and neutral-
ized by something in the record. When error is shown the 
law supplies and attaches the consequences of prejudice. 
Bindbeutal v. Street Ry. Co., 43 Mo. App. 463, 496. 
So, too, erroneous instructions are presumed to be pre-
judicial and it will be presumed that if a correct instruction 
were given, a jury might have rendered a verdict more fa-
vorable to the aggrieved party. Jaynes v. Jaynes (Calif) 
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220 P.2d 598. Had the court either properly ruled on the 
Hopkins testimony or given defendant's requested instruc-
tions Nos. 14 or 15, it is reasonable to suppose, and the 
court must presume, that the verdict would have been dif-
ferent. 
This is not a case such as Ryan v. Beaver County, 21 
P.2d 858, 82 Utah 2~, where the pleadings had been sent 
to the jury room and where the court held that although 
this was error, it was not prejudicial, since the pleadings 
contained nothing material which was not included in the 
instructions. 
Here there can be no question but that the Hbpkins 
testimony was highly prejudiciaL The court vouched for 
it by its repeated rulings admitting and confirming its 
claimed relevancy and materiality. There was no other 
expert evidence, competent or incompetent, received on the 
same subject. The evidence went dire-ctly to the amount of 
the verdict. It was prejudicial error of the most direct and 
determinative character to receive this evidence and to fail 
to even limit or define its effect. The judgment should be 
reversed on this ground, apart from the other errors in the 
record. We submit that the conclusions reached in Gordon 
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (Mont) 104 Pac. 679, should be 
applied here. 
" . Since these elements (improperly re-
ceived in evidence) may have been considered by the 
jury, and presumably were, and may have led to in-
creasing the amount of the verdict over what would 
have been allowed otherwise, we have no alternative 
but to reverse the judgment and remand the cause for 
a new trial, which is accordingly done." 
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2. IN PERMI'ITING PLAINTIFF TO RECOVER 
NOT ONLY FO,R SERWCES AND PROVISIONS FUR-
NISHED BY HER, BUT FOR THOSE OF HER DAUGH-
TER DOROTHY AND OTHERS, AND IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JlJRY AND ACTING UPON DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTS WITH RESPECT THERETO, THE COURT COM-
MITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The court's instruction No. 16 was as follows: 
"You are instructed that plaintiff would not be 
entitled to recover in this action for services rendered 
or food or provisions furnished to the deceased by any 
person or persons other than herself, unless such other 
person performed such services or furnished such food 
and provisions at the instance of, and in order to dis-
charge the duty of the one primarily obligated to per-
form such services or furnish such food or provision. 
That is to say in this ·case, if you find an agreement, 
express or implied, between the plaintiff and the de-
ceased as herein set forth, by which the plaintiff be-
came obligated to perform services and furnish food 
and provisions to deceased, and the deceased became 
obligated to pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation 
therefor, the plaintiff may have others assist in the dis-
charge of her obligation and recover the reasonable 
value of such assistance. However, she cannot recover 
for any services rendered or materials furnished by 
other persons upon their separate arrangement with 
the deceased, or upon such other person's voluntary 
contribution to the deceased." · 
This instruction is full of prejudicial error, as well as 
confusion. The first sentence refers, without qualification, 
to "the duty of the one primarily obligated to perform such 
services or furpish such food or provision." It assumes that 
there was one primarily obligated, and a duty existing. This 
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at least \vas a contested issue. Actually there is no evi-
dence in the record from which it could be said, in any 
event, that prior to the rendering of services or furnishing 
of meals there was any enforceable duty of plaintiff arising 
from agreement or otherwise. The second sentence per-
mits the jury to find an agreement, express or implied "as 
herein set forth" by which plaintiff became obligated to 
furnish food or provisions to the deceased. What evidence 
is there in the record of any express agreement binding 
plaintiff, or for that matter, of any implied agreement, 
which would have prevented plaintiff at any time from dis-
continuing her services or the furnishing of provisions? 
As a matter of fact, the evidence on both sides shows that 
when James Madsen's condition became ·bad, plaintiff and 
her daughter refused to continue, and as a consequence the 
Madsens were taken to the infirmary. 
Now, assuming in one place in the instruction that 
there was such an obligation, and in another place that the 
jury might find one, the court then permits the jury to re-
turn a verdict for the "reasonable value" of services fur-
nished by others, under the conditions therein specified, 
without reference to whether these services by others had 
already been paid for or not. Several of plaintiff's wi tnes-
ses testified that they had in one way or another assisted 
the Madsens, furnished companionship for them or brought 
them food. Whether these are intended to be referred to 
by the court when it says that plaintiff may "have others 
assist in the discharge of her obligation and recover the 
reasonable value of such assistance," is confused. But the 
court must have been referring to one or more of them. 
It seems most likely that the court had Dorothy Star-
tin, the daughter of plaintiff, in mind. Dorothy testified 
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that most of the times the plaintiff was at the James Mad-
sen home she also was there, and that she helped (Tr. 62). 
In fact, the record indicates that in many ways Dorothy 
did about as much :for the Madsens as the plaintiff. Yet 
Dorothy admitted that she received a piece of real estate 
from James Madsen (Tr. 62). At first, she said that this 
was a wedding present, but it developed that her marriage 
was about eight years previously, and that she received the 
lot on May 12, 1948, when approximately 5/6 of the ser-
vices for which plaintiff claimed compensation had been 
completed (Tr. 62). It also appeared that this lot was given 
in appreciation for Dorothy's services (Tr. 127). More-
over, at the time James Madsen was removed to the in-
firmary the plaintiff stated, and this was undenied, that 
Dorothy had a claim against him, and it appears without 
conflict that this claim was later presented to Bishop Al-
fred Madsen and paid in full (Tr. 159-163; Defendant's Ex-
hibits 3, 4 and 5). It also appears that another daughter 
of plaintiff was paid (Tr. 103). 
Under such state of the record the court tells the 
jury that if others assisted plaintiff in the discharge of her 
(assumed) "obligation," she, plaintiff, could recover the 
"reasonable value of such assistance". Not a word is men-
tioned in this connection about payment. Even though the 
jury may have found payment to have been made to these 
other persons, or an acceptance of what was paid as full 
payment irrespective of reasonable value, under this in-
struction it could yet give plaintiff the full reasonable value 
of such services or material. The court refused defend-
ant's requests 19 and 20, to the effect, respectively, that 
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover for services or 
food or provisions furnished to deceased by persons other 
I I 
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than herself, and that she would not be entitled to recover 
for those furnished by Dorothy Startin. Certainly, it would 
appear that the latter request should have been granted. 
There was no pleading of services by others. There was 
evidence that after her last service and after receiving a 
lot from James Madsen, Dorothy had submitted a bill, and 
had been paid for all she claimed. 
The court's instruction No. 16, as given, was clearly 
erroneous, for the reasons above stated. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT PLAINTIFF COULD RECOVER IN THIS 
ACTION FOR SERVICES RENDERED TO PRISCILLA 
MADSEN AS THE WIFE OF JAMES MADSEN, AND IN 
REJECTING PROOF THAT PLXl:NTIFF HAD MADE 
AN INDEPENDENT CLAIM A!GAINST THE ESTATE 
OF PRISCILLA MADSEN, AND PREVENTING CROSS 
EXAMINATION WITH RESPECT THERTO. 
In instruction No. 17 the court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
'"Under the law of this state, a husband and wife 
are jointly and severally responsible for payment for 
necessities furnished them, and a person who has fur-
nished such family necessities has the right to recover 
the full value thereof in an action against either one 
or both of the spouses. Thus, in this case if you find 
that the services rendered by plaintiff, if any, or the 
food or provision furnished by plaintiff, if any, were 
family necessities, and that the rendering of such ser-
vices or the furnishing of such food or provision by 
plaintiff was upon a contract, express or implied~ with 
the deceased, James Madsen, that plaintiff was to be 
paid therefor, and that plaintiff has not been so paid, 
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plaintiff has the right to recover from the defendant as 
executor of the estate of James Madsen, deceased, the 
full value thereof, without regard to whether or not 
she also has a right of action against the estate of Pre-
cilia Madsen ,deceased." 
The complaint in this case made no mention of Pris-
cilla Madsen, or of family expenses as such. The marriage 
relation was not pleaded, nor was any other fact involving 
Priscilla Madsen, to give the defendant notice that recovery 
was sought for services furnished to anyone other than 
James Madsen, or to give the court jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate any such claim. 
In the ,case of Walker Bros. Dry Goods Co. vs. Wood-
hall, 61 Utah 259, 212 Pac. 23, there was a complaint that 
"the defendant became indebted to the plaintiff in the sum 
of $131.21 on account of goods, wares and merchandise sold 
and delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff at defend-
ant's special instance and request." It is therein held that 
such a complaint does not permit proof that the goods 
bought by defendant's husband and charged to his account 
were for family use, under Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 2991, 
making husband and wife jointly or separately liable for 
the expenses ·of the family. The Utah case appears to have 
been based primarily upon the Oregon case of Smith v. 
Sherwin, 3 Pac. 686, involving not the introduction of evi-
dence but instructions to the jury. 
In the Walker Bros. Dry Goods case the court pointed 
out (p. 525) that "the obvious conclusion to be drawn from 
the complaint is that the defendant either in person or by 
agent purchased the goods and that the relation between 
her and the plaintiff was purely contractual." So, in this 
ca.se, the obvious conclusion to be dra w.n from the complaint 
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is that the deceased James Madsen, in person or by agent, 
obtained the services and food, etc., for himself, or at least 
at his own request, and that the relations between him and 
the plaintiff were contractual. To the contrary, however, 
the court's instruction permitted recovery against the de-
cedent's representative on the theory that there was no 
contract or request by the decedent James Madsen for all 
or a part of the services to- Priscilla Madsen, and that ser-
vices to Priscilla were rendered pursuant to arrangements 
made directly with her, but that notwithstanding this, the 
defendant would be liable for such services furnished to 
Priscilla Madsen as family necessities. 
The pertinent provisions now in force, 40-2-9, UCA, 
1943 are the same as Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, Sec. 2991, 
and read: 
"The expenses of the family and the education of 
the children are chargeable upon the property of both 
husband and wife, or of either of them, and in relation 
thereto they may be sued jointly or separately." 
The trial court in its ruling on a motion for a new trial · 
attempted to avoid the effects of the Walker Bros. Dry 
Goods Co. case by pointing out that the liability of a husband 
for his wife's necessities existed under the common law. 
Whether the liability of a husband for the support of the 
wife, in view of the prior common law liability is a statu-
tory liability for the purpose of the statute of limitations 
and other purposes, does not seem to have been determined 
by this court. It has been held that the order to make 
either spouse liable under the statute the relation of hus-
band and wife must exist and the expenses for which either 
or both are liable must be what are termed family expenses. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
Berow v. Shields, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538. It seems to 
us that the statute now specifies all ·conditions where the 
one is liable for services or goods furnished to the other. 
However, it will be noted that the common law liability was 
for necessaries, while our statute extends that liability to 
family expenses. 26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, Sec. 338, 
p. 936. The evidence of plaintiff indicates that much of 
the "services" of plaintiff, at least to Priscilla Madsen, con-
sisted of furnishing companionship or visiting. There is 
nothing to show that such "services" were such as cou1d be 
considered "necessaries" under the common law, or were 
anything other than from a mutual desire to visit on the 
part of plaintiff and Priscilla Madsen. 
A complete answer to any claimed distinction, how-
ever, is that whether a common law or statutory liability 
is involved, that liability must depend upon the existence 
of the relation of husband and wife, and must depend upon 
some form of pleading fairly informing of the claim and in-
voking the jurisdiction of the court with respect thereto. 
The doctrine of the Walker Bros. Dry Goods Co. case i!!l 
applicable on either theory. 
It is no answer to say that there was evidence that 
James Madsen requested plaintiff to assist Priscilla Mad-
sen as well as himself, and that therefore recovery could be 
predicated directly upon a contract with James Madsen. 
The instruction gave a.n additional basis for recovery, as-
suming that the jury might fail to find, as indeed they could 
and probably did, a direct contract. 
In connection with the theory of direct contract with 
James Madsen for services to Priscilla Madsen the court 
also erred in rulings on evidence. The court refused to re-
ceive in evidence the claim filed by plaintiff against the es-
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tate of Priscilla Madsen, for "services rendered for 48 
months consisting of nursing, washing, cooking, housekeep-
ing, comfort and care, together with the furnishing of food 
and provisions at $70.00 per month." (Tr. 139, 174, Defend-
ant's Ex. 2). Defendant was not permitted to cross exam-
ine the plaintiff as to whether she filed this claim against 
the estate of Priscilla Madsen, and her answer that she had 
filed such claim was stricken by the court (Tr. 188). 
If plaintiff were relying upon some contract with the 
deceased for the care, not only of the deceased, but of his 
\vife, as the court assumed in other of its instructions, 
it would be material to know whether plaintiff was con-
sistent in that claim, or whether she was looking separately 
to the Priscilla Madsen estate in a way that would be in-
consistent with the position that she did whatever she did 
because she was "obligated" to do so by contract with 
James Madsen. The evidence as to defendant's exhibit 2, 
and the exhibit itself, were admissible both in rebuttal of 
plaintiff's _claimed position, and as cross examination to 
show an inconsistent position. 
4. THE COURT DID NOT PRESENT TO THE JUR.Y 
DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE, AND RE-
FUSED DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
ON THAT THEO·RY, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE 
CASE WAS DECIDED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO DE-
FENDANT'S MAIN DEFENSE, TO HIS PREJUDICE. 
As the case developed at the trial on the defense of 
payment, which was duly pleaded, plaintiff was shown to 
have rendered services and furnished food, but it was also 
shown that she received payments from James Madsen on 
frequent occasions with the statement that this was the 
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amount due from time to time. The last of such payments, 
as shown by the record cited in the Statement of Fact 
above, was the time Mr. Madsen went to the infirmary. 
It is not ·claimed that any services or food were furnished 
by plaintiff after that time. Certainly if one receives pay-
ments from another with the statement and understanding 
between them that such payments are in full for all claims 
to their respective dates, with the parties by mutual -consent 
agreeing upon values and payments therefor, it would not 
be proper after one party has died for the other to set a 
higher value upon that for which she had been paid. Be-
cause others after the death of Mr. James Madsen might 
consider, or the jury might consider, that the services and 
food furnished by plaintiff were of a reasonable value great-
er than that which the parties by their mutual and practi-
cal acceptance agreed, would not entitle the surviving party 
to reconstruct the transactions between them and recover 
the reasonable value fixed by some other standard than 
that actually adopted during the course of such services by 
the parties themselves. 
In instruction No. 4 the court instructed the jury that 
if the decedent did incur indebtedness to plaintiff, and if 
he did not, during his lifetime, pay her all of such obliga-
tion, it should find what is the reasonable value of such ser-
vices and food and provisions for which the deceased, James 
Madsen, has not compensated the plaintiff. This instruc-
tion was calculated to induce the jury to fix a reasonable 
value apart from that which the parties may have agreed 
upon, and from such reasonable value to deduct payments 
made by James Madsen, returning a verdict for any differ· 
ence, notwithstanding that the parties by mutual consent 
during repeated transactions may have accepted and con· 
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sidered said payments actually made as being in full settle-
ment. 
In instruction No. 6 the court tells the jury that a pro-
mise to pay the reasonable value of services performed or 
property furnished by one person for another, although 
there is no express agreement as to the compensation, will 
be implied where the circumstances warrant an inference 
of a promise to pay for such services. Thus the court set 
up the reasonable value standard without reference to de-
fendant's theory that all along payments were made and 
accepted between the parties as full settlement between 
them. In instruction No. 7 the court tells the jury how a 
contract to pay the reasonable value of services may be 
implied, without reference to defendant's theory, and con-
cludes the instruction by instructing them that "If in con-
sidering all of the facts and circumstances shown by the 
evidence in this case, your mind is satisfied by a preponder-
ance of such evidence that there was such a request and 
agreement (an express request and an agreement to pay 
therefor), then plaintiff is entitled to recover the reason-
able value of such services or food or provisions, which de-
cedent has not already paid for, from the estate of the de-
cedent." The jury is permitted to deduct payments that 
it might have found were received as payments in full, from 
a reasonable value which they might find in excess of the 
value placed upon the services and food by the parties them-
selves, and return a verdict for the difference. Instruction 
No. 8 is to a similar effect, with the additional vice of plac-
ing an undue burden of proof upon the defendant. Instruc-
tions 9 and 10 again emphasize this measure of reasonable 
..- value without regard to defendant's theory. 
,..,,t 
::..-· 
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Instru·ction 11 comes a little closer to defendant's the-
ory. The first part mentions gratuitous services by reason 
of blood relationship. However, the theory of defendant 
was not that such services and provisions were gratuitous, 
but that they were paid for in accordance with the stand-
ard accepted by the parties, however less than reasonable 
value, particularly that "reasonable value" that plaintiff 
claimed at the trial and attempted to have Mrs. Hopkins 
testify to. The latter part of the instruction does mention 
that if the jury find and believe "that the deceased paid 
plaintiff in full during his lifetime for any and all services 
or food or provisions furnished and such payment was ac-
cepted by plaintiff as payment in full," their verdict should 
be "No Cause of Action." It will be noted, however, that 
not only would the jury have to find that payments were 
accepted by plaintiff in full to authorize a verdict for de-
fendant, but also "that the deceased paid plaintiff in full." 
In other words, having repeatedly been given by the court 
this detached measure of reasonable value, the jury was led 
to believe that even though they found that plaintiff ac-
cepted the payments as in full, they could not find for de-
fendant unless they also found that the payments were in 
fact "in full" in view of the court's measure of reasonable 
value. Instruction No. 13, as to services rendered gratui-
tously does not meet defendant's theory either; nowhere 
does the court present that theory; on the contrary, it in-
ferentially denies that theory repeatedly. 
We think tria t the court unduly prejudiced the defend· 
ant by giving and repeating abstract and redundant instruc-
tions on implied contracts to pay reasonable value. But 
our complaint goes deeper. The court did not attempt to 
balance these instructions, so \Veighted in favor of plaintiff, 
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with instructions setting out defendant's theory. Defend-
ant's request No. 2, before its amendment by the ·court, sug-
gested defendant's theory, but by the court's change of it, 
it negatived that theory as pointed out above. Defendant's 
request No. 8, presenting defendant's theory in another 
form, contains a notation by the court that it was given in 
substance. but the portions essential to that theory were 
eliminated by the court. Request No. 11, which was re-
fused,- presented that theory in another form: 
"You are instructed that if you find from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff furnished services or food or 
provisions to the deceased and by her activities or con-
duct let the deceased to believe that the said services, 
food or provisions, if any, were furnished without ex-
pectation of compensation except as to money, if any~ 
furnished by the deceased at the particular time, then 
you are instructed that the plaintiff would not be en-
titled to recover for such services, food or provisins, 
even though subsequently the plaintiff determined that 
she would make a claim therefor." 
Defendant's request No. 12 was refused by the court. 
We believe that what was said in our exception to this re-
:~: fusal presents valid reasons. why such refusal was preju-
!:;. dicial error; that is, that said request is a correct statement 
~: of the law, and is justified and required by the evidence; 
that it was necessary in order to properly present to the 
jury defendant's theory of the case; for the further reason 
that nowhere else in said instructions was the theory of the 
defendant covered by Request No. 12· properly presented; 
> and for the further reason that it is necessary to have the 
-;/ theory of defendant presented in the form requested in or-
,;.-- der to acquaint the jury with the law of the case; that al-
¢ though payments as received by the plaintiff may not have 
{~ 
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been considered by the jury liberal or adequate, under the 
circumstances stated here, the plaintiff could not, without 
protest, and under the circumstances indicated in the in-
struction accept and receive such payments, and then after 
the death of the deceased, claim additional or any compen-
sation. 
Request No. 12 reads: 
"You are instructed that if you find from the pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the deceased, dwing 
his lifetime, paid money to Eliza Startin with the un-
derstanding upon his part that such payments, if any, 
were in full payment of any and all obligations, if any, 
owing to the plaintiff by the said James Madsen and 
that the said plaintiff received said payments without 
protest and thereby led the deceased to believe that 
they were accepted in full payment of any and all ob-
ligations, if. any, of the deceased to the plaintiff and 
that no services were furnished by plaintiff at there-
quest of the deceased other than those which the par-
ties understood were covered by said payments, if any, 
you should return a verdict for the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, 'no cause of action.'" 
Request No. 13, which was not given in form as re-
quested, was also necessary to properly present defendant's 
theory. We believe that we are justified in saying that the 
requests of the defendant that were noted by the court to 
have been given in substance were so altered as to take the 
meat out of them on the principal theory of the defendant. 
At no point in the instructions, either in the court's own 
words or those suggested by the defendant, was the jury 
told what the law was on defendant's primary defense. 
The rule is stated in Branson's Instructions to Juries, 
Third Edition, Section 52, p. 55, as follows: 
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"A party to a cause of action is entitled to have 
his theory submitted to the jury (1) where supported 
by the evidence and the pleading, (2) and this makes 
it the duty of the court to submit all such issues, (3) 
both affirmative and negative." 
Where the testimony sustains the theory of both par-
ties, it is not enough to give the theory of one of the par-
ties, both in the affirmative and the negative, but the court 
should also give the theory of the other party. Ibid, p. 157. 
A court instructing the jury may not ignore or with-
draw from the jury issues of fact which are in the case and 
supported by evidence, a ground of liability, or a proper de-
fense. Nor should it give instructions which tend to or 
do eliminate an issue properly before the jury and supported 
by evidence, or exclude from their consideration points 
which are fairly raised by the evidence on either side. 53 
Am. Jur., "Trial," Sec. 581, pp. 458-459. 
One application of the principle is stated in Martineau 
vs. Hanson, 47 Utah 549, 155 Pac. 432, as follows: 
"The court refused defendant's request to charge 
the jury which were based upon the theory that the 
defendant did not know the financial standing of John 
H. Earl, and did not rely upon his own judgment re-
specting Earl's ability to pay the purchase price, but 
relied wholly upon the statements representations of 
the plaintiff in that regard which defendant alleged 
were false. There was, to say the least, some evidence 
produced by the defendant in support of his theory 
and averments in his answer, and for that reason we 
think the court should have charged the jury upon that 
phase of the case, if not in the language requested by 
the defendant yet in substance to that effect." 
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The trial court here neither presented defendant's the-
ory in the requested language or in its own language, but 
on the contrary, over-emphasized the contrary theory and 
at least inferentially ruled out defendant's theory. This, 
we submit, was prejudicial error. 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING TESTI-
MONY OF PLAINTIFF AS TO TRANSACTIONS WITH 
THE DECEASED CONCERNING WHICH SHE WAS IN-
COMPETENT TO TESTIFY. 
The plaintiff was called on rebuttal after the defend-
ant had rested. The court announced in considering ob-
jections to her testifying that by the personal representa-
tive's testifying to communications had between himself, 
James Madsen and the plaintiff, he had waived his protec-
tion as to those matters to which he testified (Tr. 177). 
After defendant's objection to a question put to plain-
tiff concerning Priscilla Madsen's health was overruled (Tr. 
176-177) the witness without further questioning went on 
to state that Alfred Madsen asked a Mrs. Boulton to come 
and give James Madsen his bath. Mrs. Startin went on to 
recite the conversation between her and the decedent, not 
in the presence of the defendant executor, as follows: 
"He said 'who was that woman?' I said, 'this is Mrs. 
Boulter, a nurse'. He said 'Don't let her in the house again. 
If you do I will insult her'. When Mrs. Boulter left she said 
to me, 'I don't think Mr. Madsen likes me very well, but if 
you want me to come I will come, and if I don't hear from 
you I won't come.'" (Tr. 177-178). 
Defendant moved to strike out the testimony as to the 
conversation with Mrs. Boulter, and also the answer as a 
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whole, on the grounds that the witness was incompetent 
under the so-called "Dead Man's Statute." The court gran-
ted the motion only as to Mrs. Boulter's statement, "unless 
it appears that it was in the presence of the decedent." The 
motion was otherwise denied with the effect that the con-
versation of decedent with the plaintiff, concerning which 
the defendant had never been examined, and at which he 
was not even claimed to have been present, was permitted 
to remain for the consideration of the jury (Tr. 178). This 
conversation was important and the ruling thereon highly 
prejudicial, because by it plaintiff sought to sustain her the-
sis that Mr. James Madsen entirely depended upon her and 
would permit no one else to help him. 
Plaintiff, also over the objection of defendant as to her 
competency, was permitted to testify as to her going to the 
decedent's house each day over a period of six years (Tr. 
179). No such thing had ever been testified to by defend-
ant. The witness was further permitted over objection of 
the defendant on the ground of her lack of competency un-
der the Dead Man's Statute, to testify in detail as to her 
observation of James Madsen's condition from the first of 
his illness until his death (Tr. 182-183) . She was then 
asked the following: 
Q. Now Mrs. Startin, were you paid anything by 
James Madsen during this period of six years? 
MR. CHRISTENSON: We object to the compe-
tency of the witness, if the court please, on the grounds 
heretofore stated, being incompetent under the dead 
man's statute. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled (Tr. 
183). 
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The witness then testified: 
I never was compensated from Uncle Jim, only by 
promise. Whenever I would do things that was nice 
for him, he would thank me, and say "I will see that 
you are well paid at a later date" (Tr. 184). 
_MR. CHRISTENSON: We move to strike out the 
answer, if the court please, on the ground of the in-
competency of the witness, on the grounds heretofore 
stated, and particularly the last portion of it (Tr. 184). 
THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
This testimony, dealing with a very vital point· in the 
case, and covering matters never testified to by defendant 
or any of his witnesses, was highly prejudicial. 
The witness, over the same objection, was permitted by 
the court, in response to the question of whether she was 
paid for provisions or supplies, to testify that for the first 
two years she was paid $10.00 per month for "eggs and 
milk and butter and cream, and my vegetables and prac-
tically all food . ." (Tr. 184). It was shown that. 
Charles Madsen, the defendant, was not present at any time 
the $10.00 per month was paid (Tr. 185). Charles Madsen 
at no time testified to any such arrangement. The testi-
mony was designed to, and did, show transactions wholly 
between the deceased and the party, which were never tes-
tified to by anyone except indirectly by her own witnesses. 
The plaintiff's testimony was much more certain, and force-
ful, and highly prejudiced defendant, contrary to the in-
tent and meaning of the statute referred to. The consid-
eration for such payments was limited by the Witness to 
food and groceries, tending to support her claim that ser-
vices were not covered, a most vital part of her case. 
The plaintiff was, over the same objection, permitted 
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to testify concerning the $500.00 episode which Charles 
Madsen testified to, but particularly that she did not re-
ceive $300.00, which went beyond the scope of Charles Mad-
sen's testimony. The error here was not so clean-cut, but 
is indicative of the extension by the court of plaintiff's per-
missible testimony. 
Section 104-49-2, UCA, 1943, the so-called Dead Man's 
Statute, which has been before this Court so frequently as 
to make unnecessary its quotation, contains no express ex~ 
ception to its application except the following: " . . . unless 
such witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse par-
ty so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, in such ac-
tion, suit or proceeding." 
The defendant did not call the plaintiff; in fact did not 
even cross-examine her. It may be true in certain cases 
that when the personal representative testifies as to tran-
sactions between the deceased and the adverse party an ex-
ception may be read into the law by implication, limited to 
the precise transaction involved. But to extend such ex-
ception would be a snare and a delusion to truth, as the 
penalty of enjoying the legitimate benefit of the statute 
would be for the personal representative to offer no evi-
dence whatsover. We do not believe that the law should so 
penalize him. We submit that under the law, most of the 
evidence of the plaintiff referred to above was improperly 
received. That its receipt was prejudicial is clear. 
A waiver of the Dead Man's Statute, even where such 
waiver is held to exist, is a limited one. The statute is not 
waived as to other transactions or conversations. 
Carter vs.- Curlew Creamery Co., 134 P. 2d 66 (Wash). 
Kraft vs. Security State Bank, 223 NW, 208 (S. D.). 
Burk vs .. Peter, ___ Utah , 202 P 2d 543. 
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6. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE 
DEFENDAN'TI WIDCH WERE CALLED FOR BY THE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Inherent in this case were dangers that the jury would 
permit sympathy for the plaintiff to affect their judgment, 
or would be inclined to speculate as to possible agreements 
or understandings not shown by the evidence, or would en-
deavor to effect the distribution of the estate, apart from 
the issues involved in the pleadings and evidence, to plain-
tiff as one of James Madsen's heirs according to their ideas 
on the law or practice of distribution to heirs. 
In defendant's request No. 6 the court was requested 
to instruct the jury that in the absence of evidence as to an 
express or implied contract they could not presume or spec-
ulate that such a contract existed. 
Defendant's request No. 10 reads: 
''You are instructed that you should not permit 
sympathy for any party influence your verdict in this 
·case, but you should decide the case solely on the evi-
dence in the light of the instructions of the court." 
The court noted on this request that it was given in 
substance. We do not think that the stock instruction, No. 
21, reached the point of sympathy, which was particularly 
pertinent in this case. It specifically mentions prejudice, 
but there is no direct reference to the matter of sympathy. 
In this case we believe that we were entitled to the requested 
instruction, and we believe the verdict, by the failure to give 
it, may have been improperly affected by sympathy. 
The court was requested by defendant's request No. 17 
to give this instruction: 
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"In this case the jury should not be concerned with 
who the beneficiaries of the estate of James Madsen 
are, of what the property of said estate consists, or how 
it is to be divided among those named in the will, be-
cause in the probate proceeding independent of this ac-
tion the Court will interpret the will and direct distri-
bution of the estate after payment of the deceased's 
just debts and costs of administration to the persons 
entitled thereto as provided by law." 
There had been mention of the fact that James 
Madsen had left a will, and the fact that Charles Madsen 
was one of the beneficiaries was inferred. The fact that 
he was executor was constantly before the jury. It was 
also repeatedly inferred, and argued, that the unfortunate 
plaintiff was being turned out without due consideration. 
Unless expressly cautioned, the jurors could well have been 
inclined to permit the question of distribution of James Mad-
sen's estate to affect their judgment. 
While we realize that generally the giving of cautionary 
instructions is discretionary with the court, it is believed 
that under the peculiar facts of this case the failure to cau-
tion the jury on the subjects indicated was an abuse of dis-
cretion and ·contributed, at least in some measure, to this 
unjust verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff, as well as members of her family, were 
paid for any services rendered to the Madsens in accordance 
with the standards agreed upon by them. The jury's verdict 
is traceable to the erroneous instructions of the court, and 
its repeated errors in ruling upon questions of evidence. The 
court improperly received the testimony of Mrs. Mary Hop-
kins and erred in permitting the jury to consider it, without 
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at least some limitation. It erred in instructing the jury, and 
in rejecting defendant's proffered instructions concerning re-
covery by plaintiff for services and provisions furnished by 
Dorothy Startin and others. It erred in instructing the jury 
that plaintiff could recover in this action for services ren-
dered to Priscilla Madsen as the wife of James Madsen, and 
in rejecting proof that plaintiff had made an independent 
claim against the estate of Priscilla Madsen and thus nega-
tived any such contract with James Madsen as she claimed 
existed. It erred in failing and refusing to instruct the jury 
on defendant's theory of the case, although repeating and 
emphasizing plaintiff's theories unduly. It erred in receiv-
ing testimony of plaintiff as to transactions with the de-
ceased concerning which she was incompetent to testify. 
It erred in refusing to give cautionary instructions request- . 
ed by the defendant in view of the nature of the case, not-
withstanding its discretion in the premises. All of these 
errors were highly prejudicial. An improper verdict was ar-
rived at as a result. 
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial gran-
ted, with costs to appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
Defendant's Adqress: 
First Security Bank Building, 
Provo, ,Utah. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Provo, R. F. D., Utah. 
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